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Color-Blind Prophets and Bootstrap
Philosophies: Straw Men, Shell
Games and Social Criticism
Stuart Alan Clarke
He is a man of words and ideas, and since I, too, find my identity in
the world of ideas and words, where would I flee? I still endure the
nonsense of fools with a certain patience, but when a respected critic
distorts my situation in order to feel comfortable in the abstractions
he would impose upon American reality, then it is indeed "in
accordance with my nature" to protest. Ideas are important in
themselves, perhaps, but when they are interposed between me and
my sense of reality I feel threatened; they are elusive, they move
with missile speed and are too often fired from altitudes rising high
above the cluttered terrain upon which I struggle. And too often
those with a facility for ideas find themselves in the councils of
power representing me at the double distance of racial alienation
and inexperience.
Ralph Ellison'
Ralph Ellison almost always has something useful to say. In "The
World and the Jug," his celebrated rebuke of Irving Howe, Ellison offers
an eloquent and passionate discussion of the moment in cultural politics
when social criticism enacts a relationship between representation as
depiction and representation as delegation.2 For Ellison, Howe's "Black
Boys and Native Sons" exemplified the dangers involved if there is too
much distance between ideas and images that are crafted at lofty social
altitudes and life as it is lived on the cluttered terrain of political and
personal struggle. When these ideas and images serve to underwrite
structures of legal, political or cultural representation, then culture has
become emphatically political, and the Shadow has subsumed the Act.
Ellison's confident insistence on the texture, richness and sheer human
opacity of African American life has allowed him to navigate provoca-
1. Ralph Ellison, The World and the Jug in SHADOW AND ACT 122-3 (1964)
2. Isaac Julien and Kobena Mercer, Introduction - De Margin and De Centre, 29 SCREEN 4
(1988).
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tively between the devil of ethnic chauvinism and the deep, blue-eyed sea
of American nationalism. His social and cultural criticism consistently
reminds us of the political imperative to pay close attention to the power-
ful complexity that characterizes the lives and experiences of African
Americans.
Ellison is especially worth recalling now, as we struggle towards a
social criticism that does justice to the cultural and political conditions
currently facing black populations. These conditions exhibit a bewilder-
ing good news/bad news character: nearly unprecedented levels of eco-
nomic affluence and political prominence compete with astounding
material poverty and new forms of political and social powerlessness. A
broad black "middle class," fattened on affirmative action and the cul-
tural pragmatism of corporate personnel offices, vies for our attention
with a "black underclass" of crack smoking, "Pump" wearing, "Pimp
Rolling" baby-making black male hooligans-or so the popular represen-
tation goes. At the same time, a post-Voting Rights Act explosion of
black elected officials coincides with the ever-tightening stranglehold of
capital on municipal and federal decisional processes. The result? Afri-
can American populations characterized by significant class divisions
with unclear consequences as well as a widespread deflation of political
agency.
It is ironic that in the face of these deeply complicated circumstances
much of the most forcefully promoted African American social criticism
is burdened by an unfortunate superficiality. The widely accepted insis-
tence on the social construction of racial meanings and identities has in
the hands of writers like Glen Loury, Thomas Sowell, and Shelby Steele
resulted in the "return of the repressed" liberal subject for whom race is
a socially interesting but politically and economically irrelevant artifact.
It is hardly surprising that after eight years of Ronald Reagan and two
years "in the Bush" these color-blind prophets and bootstrap philoso-
phers should receive especially energetic attention. There are three
unfortunate elements that characterize much of their work.
First, "race" is often manipulated as an empty trope through vague
references to a "black community," references that obscure more than
they reveal the conditions, beliefs, and aspirations of really existing black
people.
Second, this trope facilitates a peculiar shell game in which the social
critic gains a certain measure of credibility and authority on account of
his membership in this "black community." This authority and credibil-
ity bestows benefits in another community altogether: the professional
academic or journalistic community. Finally, the critic garners kudos for
his courage in braving the censure of this "black community" for dissent-
ing from the community "orthodoxy"-an "orthodoxy" that is often lit-
tle more than a discursive straw man.
[Vol. 3: 83
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These critics often promote what seems to me to be an especially car-
toon-like characterization of political discourse in "the black commu-
nity," a characterization that corresponds neatly to the mass media's
narrow view of contemporary African American social criticism. The
mass-mediated representation of African American social criticism is a
bipolar characterization that reinforces a particular image of the
demographics of the black population. This demographic image is one of
a black population that is composed of a "risin' " black middle class and
a "decinin'" black underclass.
Similarly, the mass media portray African American social criticism as
a hybrid animal. On the one end of the beast are black voices that
preach the evils of affirmative action and promote the virtues of a color-
blind meritocracy--our color-blind prophets and bootstrap philosophers.
At the other end is an anachronistic "traditional civil rights leadership"
clinging to a politics of racial entitlement that is necessarily dependent on
the racial goodwill, economic prosperity, and Democratic Party domi-
nance of a bygone era.
The problem is that the media characterize the universe of African
American social criticism in terms of two of its constituent discourses.
Some of the most original and powerful writers in America today-social
critics like Audre Lorde and June Jordan among others-are entirely
excluded from this mass-mediated representation of "black political
thought." Without the voices of black women and gay men and lesbians
of color, spokespersons who are tantamount to servants of the mass
media can monopolize the imagery of black populations and the political
possibilities those populations represent. As Audre Lorde writes: "down
the street/ a glassmaker is grinning/ turning out new mirrors that lie/
selling us/ new clowns/ at cut rate."
Prominent critics like Steel and Loury are often well meaning, with
important and sensitive points to make. Their arguments are not neces-
sarily specious or pernicious. These arguments are, however, often over-
shadowed by the picture of the "black community" that emerges from
them. This picture both authorizes and draws credibility from the super-
ficial representation of African American social criticism that is pro-
moted in the "dueling talking heads" school of journalism, the
abbreviated discourse of Nightline, The McNeil-Lehrer Report and News-
week or Time magazines.
The article "Loving the Messenger" written by Stephen Carter and
published in the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities both relies on
and contributes to a truncated misrepresentation of "black political
thought." In the rest of this essay I will discuss Carter's article in order
to illustrate the discursive practice that I am complaining about, and
then I will consider the way in which attention to certain marginalized
1991]
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black voices can help to expand our understanding and representations of
black political thought.
In the review essay "Loving the Messenger" published in the second
issue of the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities,3 Stephen Carter joins
a small but robust chorus of black intellectuals who bemoan what they
take to be a crippling stifling of dissent within "the black community."
Most often heard from high profile public figures like Glen Loury and
Thomas Sowell, this complaint alleges the existence of a "liberal civil
rights orthodoxy" within "the black community," an orthodoxy that
confronts deviation with allegations of race treason.
Professor Carter's essay raises important questions about solidarity,
dissent, and politics among and between black folks but these questions
are obscured in his attempt to affirm his own bonds to particular intellec-
tual traditions and communities. By focusing on an extreme case of
intolerance-the treatment of Julius Lester at the hands of the University
of Massachusetts at Amherst Afro-American Studies Department-
Carter justifies his turn to an opposite extreme-academic mythologies of
intellectual combat-for remedies. It is relatively easy to throw stones at
those who would sanction and engage in purges, intolerance, and name
calling. It is just as easy to promote pristine, sterile standards of conduct
in public political discourse. Useful academic interventions in public dis-
course begin, however, with the recognition that real political communi-
ties exist somewhere in between free speech situation-utopias and fascist
nightmares.
Lovesong: Becoming a Jew, Julius Lester's account of his conversion to
Judaism, is the occasion for Carter's remarks.4 The text includes
descriptions of several instances in which Lester was ostracized (and
worse) by black folks unhappy with positions that he had taken on black-
Jewish relations. Lester's account provokes Carter to consider
the link between [the text's] message and the way in which too many
in the black community have chosen to isolate dissenters from the
community's orthodoxy.5
To a certain extent all reviewers use the texts that they review as pegs
on which to hang their own views, but in Carter's case this process is
quite explicit. Carter insists that Lester's work can be read as an "alle-
gory on the civil rights movement"6 and while he "would not contend
that the story [he has read] is the one that the author decided consciously
to tell"7 it is this "subtextual allegory" which grounds the "message"
that Carter chooses to discuss.
3. Stephen L. Carter, Loving the Messenger, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 317 (1989).
4. J. Lester, LOVESONG: BECOMING A JEW (1988).
5. Carter, supra note 3, at 319.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 318.
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Carter takes Lester's central contention to be that
the civil rights movement will not recover its spiritual greatness or
its momentum until the leadership of the black community once
again preaches to the oppressed that only the inner moral progress
of suffering individuals moves the conscience of the society around
them.8
While Professor Carter doesn't take an explicit position on this "differ-
ent and quite tantalizing theory" of the malaise of the civil rights move-
ment, he does utilize the concept of "suffering" to focus his own attack
on the "civil rights orthodoxy" that he believes underwrites black sup-
port for what he calls "racial preference policies." From here, it is a
short jaunt to the horse that Carter really wants to flog: intellectual
intolerance in the black community as indicated by treatment of those
blacks who dissent from this "orthodoxy."
Carter's position goes something like this: contemporary civil rights
advocates misconstrue the significance of black suffering, rest a "racial
preference" orthodoxy on this misconstruction, and deal harshly with
those blacks who dare to stray from this orthodoxy. The problem is that
each leg of Carter's construction is infirm.
Carter rebukes contemporary civil rights advocates who adopt an
exceptionalist attitude towards black suffering-thai is, an insistence that
"black people have suffered as a people in some special manner that
touches everyone who is black and no one else." To Carter's mind they
have foregone the lessons of their predecessors, who understood that
"only the inner moral progress of suffering individuals moves the con-
science of the society around them."9
It is perfectly reasonable to reject claims that black folks have cornered
the market on suffering. The problem is that Carter offers no evidence to
support his claim that this particular attitude towards suffering drives
"contemporary civil rights advocates." Indeed, he pays no attention to
the possibility that advocates of "racial preference policies" are driven by
the infinitely more reasonable conviction that black folks have sustained
a unique injury for which we need to be compensated. Nor does he con-
sider the possibility that many civil rights activists may be driven by a
vision of a society in which diversity, social harmony and some measure
of egalitarianism replace social strife, inequality and mythologies of indi-
vidual achievement.
We can and probably should argue about the legacy of slavery, just as
we can and should argue about the nature of a just society, and Professor
Carter is not unaware that such arguments can be relevant to the "racial
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quent defense" of such policies as an "obligation of citizenship, little dif-
ferent from paying taxes.") Carter avoids such arguments, however, by
caricaturing the "civil rights community" along the lines of the dated
views of Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, the writings of Der-
rick Bell and the work of Harold Cruse. While there are most certainly
some living black people who would own up to the views that Carter
describes, it is nothing short of scandalous that he should, without even
the skimpiest shred of evidence, claim to have unearthed the structure of
some "civil rights orthodoxy."
The problem is not that Carter has misidentified the orthodoxy.
Although his claims beg for substantiation-data to indicate the breadth
of this "orthodoxy," or some indication of the influence of the works that
he cites-"more evidence" is somewhat beside my point. The point is
that, as with all arguments about consensus, Carter's discussion of this
"orthodoxy" ignores the complexity and multiplicity that should be the
real starting point for contemporary African American social criticism.
His representation silences (or more precisely, presumes the silence of)
voices other than his and his antagonists', and in doing so mutes the
political possibilities that real differences within black populations create.
The point that Carter really wants to stress (hence the title "Loving
the Messenger") is the "link" between Lester's message about suffering,
and "the way in which too many in the black community have chosen to
isolate dissenters from the community's orthodoxy." "Tragically," he
writes,
but perhaps understandably, the black community is one in which
dissent is stifled. Evidently, a good deal turns on solidarity, on not
revealing to the world that some black people who have thought
deeply about the problems facing our community disagree with the
consensus position on both the causes and the cures of the problems
that bedevil our people.10
This issue of dissent, it seems to me, is a vitally important one, espe-
cially as it raises hard and uncomfortable questions about what it is that
constitutes a "community" as distinct from a population.
It never occurs to Carter that "declarations of independence" of the
kind embodied in the work of figures like Lester, Loury and Sowell nec-
essarily stand in some tension to the idea of a community. Obviously I
do not mean to endorse the type of "purge" that he and Lester describe.
Nevertheless, such purges constitute an extreme whose polar opposite is
a normless community that is probably better characterized as a "popu-
lation." In order for a community to be anything more than a popula-
tion, it must have borders that are policed in some fashion. The hard
questions seem to me to revolve around the measure of independence and
10. Id. at 344.
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autonomy that can be reasonably sacrificed for the sake of community.
How is respect for a community and its members appropriately demon-
strated? Indeed, how is membership appropriately manifested?
These questions are thoroughly considered in some of the recent work
of political theorist Michael Walzer. In Interpretation and Social Criti-
cism " and The Society of Critics2 Walzer develops his notion of the
importance of "connected criticism." Walzer wants to construct a
framework for thinking about the relationship between the need for a
connected critic to respect her community and her need for integrity and
independence in criticism. He insists that critics must "look for a way of
talking in tune with but also against their new accompaniment. They
need to find a place to stand, close to but not engulfed by their
company."13
The difficulty for the connected social critic, then, involves engaging
the historical, cultural and discursive norms of her community at the
same time that she utilizes the distance that any real criticism requires.
This circumstance produces the questions that the critic must address:
What sort of authority can he claim? How much distance does he
require? Where does he find his standards? What language does he
speak? What motives set him to work? 4
It would seem to be to Carter's benefit to ignore these hard questions,
in favor of kissing babies and blasting terrorists. Playing a little fast and
loose with the character of "the black community" offers powerful
advantages. In his broad and easy generalizations and his constant refer-
ences to the black community, Carter seems to rely on what I would
think of as a minimalist conception of "black community," a conception
of a community whose membership is defined (so far as I can tell) solely
in terms of skin color and "common history." This is a conception that
underwrites his own membership, and it is disingenuous in the extreme
to ignore the fact that his clear presentation of himself as a member of
"the black community" confers credibility and authority on his account.
At the same time, the burden of his essay seems to be that "the black
community" is defined at least in part in terms of adherence to and
enforcement of an "orthodoxy." Indeed, the only indications that he
offers for what this "black community" looks like have to do with this
orthodoxy; he makes no attempt to indicate how we would define this
community independent of this orthodoxy. This is why I characterize
his conception as "minimalist," and it is in this regard that "race" takes
on the character of an empty trope.
Once again, the problem is not that he has misdefined "the black com-
11. M. Walzer, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987).
12. M. Walzer, THE SOCIETY OF CRITICS (1988).
13. Id. at 26.
14. Id. at 27.
1991]
7
Clarke: Color-Blind Prophets and Bootstrap Philosophies
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1991
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
munity": I do not want more or better evidence. The problem is that the
fiction of a black community may very likely have become more trouble
than it is worth. Without the kind of delineation that would necessarily
acknowledge many different black communities, with different needs, dif-
ferent structures of membership and different histories, we are all too
likely to wind up with another empty trope readily susceptible to being
colonized by whatever racial representations happen to be close at hand.
At any rate, Carter uses Lester's experience of dissent to ground a
broader discussion of the "problem" of dissent within "the black commu-
nity." In doing so, he underwrites a perspective from which "dissenters"
like Lester, Sowell, and Carter himself are held to be courageous in view
of their willingness to flout what appear to be the norms of the commu-
nity "orthodoxy": norms that are considerably stricter than those that a
minimalist conception would produce. Norms that, if they do in fact
exist in the form that these writers suggest, would seem to have already
effectively excommunicated them and rendered their critique an external
one. All too often these "dissenters" produce critiques that stem from
outside any "black community" of more than minimal definition but gain
authority and credibility by masquerading as internal critiques.
This little shell game is nowhere more apparent than in Carter's essay,
when this tenured member of the Yale Law School faculty writes:
And of course, we must be careful, for our need for these free-think-
ing dissenters may prove to be greater than their need for us. The
black "conservatives," so called, are relatively comfortable in their
academic sinecures, which is, after all, what academic sinecures are
for. Despite the name-calling of their critics, they will not be
silenced. And they should not be.I5
If the game is to find Professor Carter's pea, my guess is that most of
the "black folk" with whom he professes community are going to put
their money on the "academic sinecure" shell every time. They know
very well that he probably couldn't (and definitely wouldn't) write as he
does if he "lived" anyplace else. On the other hand, those who know no
better than to automatically grant Carter authority in Negro affairs-
those most akin to tourists in these matters-may not be quite so sure.
My money is with the black folk. Carter's arguments for the impor-
tance and the integrity. of dissent are moving in a relatively narrow
sphere. But they are considerably more persuasive in an academic set-
ting than they are outside the academy. Carter seems to want "us" to
care passionately and seriously about ideas without ever losing the civil-
ity and sobriety of the seminar room. In seminars, with little more than
grades or academic standing at stake, such immaculate concern may be
possible and even likely. But when ideas and their promotion have real
15. Carter, supra note 3, at 348.
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consequences for people's lives, it may in fact be entirely appropriate and
even necessary to "be able to tell the good guys from the bad guys."
Carter is correct to insist that "the critics are obviously angry at the
dissenters, and their anger stems from a deeply felt worry about the con-
sequences of the dissent." Dissent, particularly rabid dissent, from com-
munal norms has real costs in the real world, especially when, in cases
like those that Carter cites, the dissenters are not "pure intellectuals" (if
such an animal exists) but clearly and emphatically political agents.
These costs are both necessary and desirable if "community" is to have
any real meaning and force with respect to political mobilization and
power. Once again, the hard questions involve the relationship between
the magnitude and the character of these costs on the one hand, and the
self-understanding of the community on the other.
In focusing on an easy case at the extreme, Carter allows himself to
avoid these questions. He writes as if this extreme case is the norm, justi-
fying his turn to the opposite extreme for remedial measures. "Perhaps,"
he writes, "the time has come for a latter-day Niagara,"
for a new manifesto in which we who are black and choose to dis-
sent might proclaim, in much the same terms that DuBois used, our
right to think for ourselves. We must demand the right to comment
on any subject, no matter how sacred to the orthodoxy. We must
worship no authority as absolute, except for truth itself. 6
In insisting on an absolute and unyielding commitment to "truth
itself," Carter presents a conception of community whose methods and
manners of enforcement are defined not in terms of important requisites
for political mobilization and collective power, but instead in terms of
what he perceives to be the needs of intellectuals. If he indicated any
recognition whatsoever that members must pay dues, then we could
argue about how large those dues ought to be. Instead, he offers an affir-
mation of his bond with a particular community of intellectuals that is
poorly disguised as a vision of a democratic black community.
There is nothing wrong with Carter's trumpeting of his intellectualist
allegiances. As he points out, that is, "after all, what academic sinecures
are for." He needs, however, to recognize that the conditions and char-
acter of political engagement are quite different from those that most
often accompany these allegiances.
It is naive if not disingenuous to suggest that all that matters is the
promotion of truth. The suggestion that I will say whatever I wish, and
that some understanding of truth is all that need guide me in this project
is extremely self-indulgent. An unfettered search for truth is part of our
mythology about the structure of intellectual communities, but it ought
not be a part of our understanding of the structure of political communi-
16. Id. at 349.
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ties. As realists we understand that ideas fired from high social altitudes
enter an already politicized discursive field and will therefore have polit-
ical consequences. Perhaps our understanding of ourselves as academics
or as individuals requires us to shoot first and ask questions later, but if
this is the case then we must recognize the personal and professional
imperatives that drive this decision. Carter and Lester can and must be
free to say what they wish, but they are not free to determine whose
interests will be served by what they say, and their understanding of their
obligations to the various communities that they inhabit must be negoti-
ated with that fact in mind. I don't mean to suggest that this is an easy
or obvious calculation to make; members can and probably should differ
about their obligations to their common community. All I ask is that
some attention be paid to the discursive context within which criticism
will exist.
Carter's essay raises important and pressing issues that he all but
ignores. His rather idealistic restatement of norms of intellectual engage-
ment is touching, but worse than useless in addressing the real problems
of developing and maintaining political communities among black peo-
ple. There is, I think, a role for "black intellectuals" in this latter task
but it is not to insist that struggles over programs, policies and, ulti-
mately, communal norms, take place on our terms. Instead, it begins
with efforts to understand the political terrain; we should attempt to
understand the way in which historical, economic, cultural and political
factors shape the possibilities for political community in any particular
instance. We must begin on the ground, helping to build political com-
munities out of the traditions and conditions which exist within black
populations, rather than constructing philosopher kingdoms in the air.
I have neither the time nor the space to detail the locally specific fac-
tors which must condition critical interventions in political struggles
involving black populations. There are, however, some general points
that I believe ought to underwrite any attempt at African American
social criticism.
Ultimately, effective social criticism ought to address the structure and
functions of the state, but the first order political problem is always to
mobilize and organize individuals: the development and sustenance of
democratic agencies and instrumentalities for the assertion of control
over the organization and distribution of social power.
I am referring to agencies and instrumentalities that can underwrite a
democratization of access to two kinds of social power: social power as
an output of the state and the economy (goods, services, privileges) and
social power as a product of collective action (agency, political self-
respect and political efficacy). These agencies and instrumentalities must
include traditional political parties and labor unions, but they must also
include consumer and community groups, cultural organizations and
[Vol. 3: 83
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other instrumentalities that can reach persons excluded or otherwise
alienated from traditional avenues of political expression.
African American social criticism must also address the problems
posed for political agency by what many consider to be a "postmodern"
fragmentation of African American identity-a disruption of the coher-
ence of racial identity along fault lines of gender, sexuality and economic
and social well-being. This fragmentation (or perhaps just the greater
awareness of fragmentation) promotes politically significant differences
that must be carefully negotiated if democratic forms of African Ameri-
can political agency are to flourish. The representation of a black popu-
lation bifurcated in crude class terms is a politically enervating
simplification. Forms of African American political organization must
evolve to accommodate the myriad differences within black populations.
To cite what should by now be an obvious example, the days when black
men made the political rules and black women made the coffee are so far
gone that it isn't even funny. The substance and the setting of political
deliberations within black populations must continue to change accord-
ingly. Equally important, the manner in which African American poli-
tics and political activity are depicted must keep pace with these changes.
If the fragmented materials of "postmodern" African American iden-
tity are to be forged into coherent political subjectivities, it will be in part
because "race" is utilized as a category of political mobilization. This is
undeniably a dangerous and problematic strategy since it is common for
"race" to be utilized to obscure other social constructions like class and
gender. This is a move that has historically cut both ways: white politi-
cians use "race" to pit working class blacks and whites against one
another, but black politicians use "race" to mobilize (and demobilize)
black populations in the ultimate service of the imperatives of capital and
patriarchy.
In spite of the dangers of strategies for an explicitly racial political
subjectivity, it is ultimately naive and unhelpful to insist that "race" be
completely expunged as a tool for political mobilization. Such an insis-
tence willfully ignores the "cluttered terrain" of which Ellison speaks.
Race is, as Ellison also reminds us, much more thanjust the white man's
dilemma, and there is something vaguely offensive in the suggestion that
it can or should be reduced to political insignificance. Black folks have
made a life on the horns of this dilemma, and it is unlikely that many of
us will be willing to sharply distinguish that admittedly subjective and
contested "racial" life from our political lives in order to "clean up" the
rhetoric and practice of American politics.17 "Race" matters and will
17. "But can a people (its faith in an idealized American Creed notwithstanding) live and
develop for over three hundred years simply by reacting? Are American Negroes simply the creation
of white men, or have they at least helped to create themselves out of what they found around them?
Men have made a way of life in caves and upon cliffs, why cannot Negroes have made a life upon the
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continue to matter, and to expunge it from political discourse and prac-
tice is to extinguish an indispensable (if sometimes unfortunate) flame of
human interest and desire.
Since "race" cannot and should not be expunged from politics and
political discourse, it is so much more important that it be handled with
care and responsibility. Balancing the danger and the promise in the util-
ization of "race" as a tool for political mobilization presumes the mainte-
nance of a distinction between "race" as an empty trope marshalled to
organize power and "race" as a textured repository of cultural meanings
and political aspirations. This is undoubtedly too neat a distinction with
something of the hum of the word processor about it. But it will have to
suffice if we are to view race as a socially constructed phenomenon that
need not be exclusive or antagonistic. By "race as an empty trope" I
mean to indicate uses of "race" that manipulate prejudice, fear and
hatred-uses that are negative and exclusive. As part of a political lan-
guage of identity, race can and must be constructed to allow (if not facili-
tate) personal and political exchanges: to deconstruct classist, sexist and
heterosexist discourses and practices.
An Ellisonian sensitivity to the requirements of contemporary African
American criticism can be found in the writings of black women like
Bernice Johnson Reagon, June Jordan, Audre Lorde and others. 8 Much
of this work is characterized by three salutary elements. First, it recog-
nizes the need for an African American social criticism that does justice
to the multiple African American subjectivities borne of the post-Civil
Rights Movement era. Second, it focuses this criticism on the possibility
of building coalitions that reach across race, gender, sexuality and eco-
nomics and culture. Finally, it is aware that such coalitions are indispen-
sable because civil rights problems are not minority problems, but are,
instead, majority problems of power and powerlessness that involve
international oppression and environmental degradation as surely as they
involve racial or sexual discrimination.
In their efforts to develop what they call a "theory in the flesh," the
editors of This Bridge Called My Back- Writings by Radical Women of
Color attempt to respond to the often contradictory manner in which
race, class, gender and sexual orientation interact in constituting per-
sonal identity and interpersonal politics. Theirs is an approach to social
criticism "where the physical realities of our lives-our skin color, the
land or concrete we grew up on, our sexual longings-all fuse to create a
politic born out of necessity": a politic that does not require anyone to
horns of the white man's dilemma?" Ellison, An American Dilemma. A Review, in SHADOW AND
ACT at 315.
18. Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua, THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY
RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (1981); Barbara Smith, HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST
ANTHOLOGY (1983); June Jordan, MOVING TOWARDS HOME: POLITICAL ESSAYS (1989); Audre
Lorde, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984).
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repress elements of their selves in order to "get with the program."19
Finding themselves "the colored in a white feminist movement, the femi-
nists among the people of our culture" and often "the lesbians among the
straight," these women "attempt to bridge the contradictions in [their]
experience" by "naming ourselves and telling our stories in our own
words."20
These critics are also acutely aware of the need for coalitional work,
and the possibility of mining differences for the creative possibilities that
they offer.2" Audre Lorde, for example, insists that it is not difference
itself that separates people, but a refusal to "recognize differences and
examine distortions which result from misnaming them and their effects
upon human behavior and expectation."22 When differences are seen as
"a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark
like a dialectic," control over the representations of ourselves and
others-naming rather than misnaming difference and its conse-
quences-is a first step towards control over the possibilities for political
cooperation. In the poem "Good Mirrors Are Not Cheap," Lorde cap-
tures the tragedy of representations that facilitate the misnaming and
misunderstanding of differences: "It is a waste of time hating a mirror/or
its reflection/ instead of stopping the hand/ that makes glass with distor-
tions/slight enough to pass/ unnoticed . . . Because at the same time/
down the street/a glassmaker is grinning/ turning out new mirrors that
lie/ selling us/ new clowns/ at cut rate."23
Finally, these writers recognize the importance of broadening our
understanding of civil rights and "minority issues." June Jordan insists
that "in America, you can segregate the people, but the problems will
travel."24 Writing of the Jesse Jackson presidential campaign, she argues
for a broad view of civil rights, a view that considers it to be a majority
problem:
Was hunger a Black problem or an American disgrace? Was equal
access to good housing and education a Black demand or a necessity
inside a "democratic state"? Was "Jobs or Income" an unreasona-
ble, left-wing slogan, or a matter of human survival?2 5
Jordan calls for a new social criticism to accommodate a new majority
situation of powerlessness: "Somebody needs to write aggressive new
19. Moraga and Anzaldua, Id. at 23.
20. Id.
21. See especially Bernice Johnson Reagon, Coalition Politics Turning the Century in Smith,
supra note 18.
22. Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House in Lorde, supra
note 18 at 115.
23. Audre Lorde, FROM A LAND WHERE OTHER PEOPLE LIVE (1973) at 15.
24. Jordan, Problems of Language in a Democratic State in Jordan, supra note 18 at 126.
25. Jordan, American in Confrontation with Democracy or The Meaning of the Jesse Jackson
Campaign in Jordan, supra note 18 at 206.
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editorials," she says, "somebody needs to write aggressive new state-
ments of social design and demand. '26 Taken together these women are
attempting to address the needs that stem from the circumstances of
African American life in the contemporary period-the need to develop
clear, accurate representations of the differences between and among peo-
ple and the need to develop strategies and languages to facilitate organi-
zation and mobilizations across the boundaries that the misnaming and
the misrepresentation of difference help to erect.
Many of Stephen Carter's instincts are laudable: his effort to bridge
difference mirrors the work of writers like Jordan, Lorde, and Reagon.
The problem is that to suggest that the black community is accurately
represented in terms of black anti-semitism and some "civil rights ortho-
doxy" is to construct a straw man that he can pick apart in order to
establish his own credentials as a courageous dissenter. This is especially
problematic as it promotes an image of the black population as most
likely unreceptive to the kind of coalitional work that political mobiliza-
tion and organization requires. Carter's valuable insights are obscured
by his inclination to write in such a manner as to validate the most nar-
row and uninformed stereotypes of "the black community."
As can be seen in the work of black women like June Jordan and
Audre Lorde, there are African American social critics who have no
choice but to combat and remake stereotyped representations of black-
ness and "the black community." They are critics who know from often
bitter experience that what it means to be black has perhaps never been
as complex as it is today-critics who understand that the social, cultural
and political factors that condition African American lives require an
Ellisonian attention to that complexity.
It isn't surprising that the voices of these women are so often ignored
in the depiction of African American political discourse. Those who
construct the representations of politics and political discourse in this
country have never been at a loss for ways and reasons to overlook and
trivialize the political contributions of women, especially the contribu-
tions of women of color. We have, I would suggest, paid dearly for this
indulgence. Confronting politics in its clean, abstract, cartoon-like out-
lines has left behind a mess for others to clean up, others whom we would
prefer to treat as the maids and housekeepers of our political culture. We
can little afford to continue this foolish conceit.
26. Jordan, supra note 24 at 30.
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